There was a noticeable shift in the country’s political landscape towards the UNP and its leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe. Chandrika’s declining popularity from 1994 to 1999, due to her inability to sustain it during her five-year tenure, led to a 
significant disparity. As a result, the contest between her and Ranil Wickremesinghe became increasingly close. However, this dynamic shifted somewhat with the crossover of several UNP members, including Sarath Amunugama, to the SLFP, signalling the start of the 1999 Presidential Election campaign.
When President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga called for Presidential Elections in 1999, the Elections Commissioner was recovering from a heart attack. His planned return to schedule the elections in early November was delayed by the President’s haste to choose an astrologically auspicious date. Consequently, she appointed the deputy as the acting Commissioner to expedite the process. The acting Commissioner, influenced by astrological considerations, set the date for December 21, aligning with CBK’s birth time, believed to have a significant impact on the day’s outcome, promising success according to astrological interpretations.
The prediction by Asiaweek magazine, suggesting that ‘the odds may well be in Wickremesinghe’s favour to be the next President of Sri Lanka,’ brought a sense of reassurance to the United National Party (UNP) and its supporters. However, amid this optimism, there were internal elements within the UNP who sought to disrupt Ranil Wickremesinghe’s campaign by orchestrating crossovers.
Rival factions
Some UNPers, dissatisfied or disillusioned for various reasons, aimed to sow discord and instability within the party by defecting to rival factions or alliances. Their actions threatened to undermine the unity and coherence of the UNP’s electoral strategy, posing challenges to Wickremesinghe’s bid for the presidency. Despite facing such internal turmoil, Wickremesinghe and his supporters remained resilient, striving to maintain cohesion and focus amidst the turbulent political landscape.
Meanwhile, Minister Ashraff outlined a three-point claim for his support of President Kumaratunga, emphasising the necessity for a free and fair election and advocating for the President’s accountability to Parliament by relinquishing all legal immunities granted by the Constitution. Ashraff’s motives were strategic; he understood that CBK would likely reject these demands, allowing him the flexibility to assess the political landscape and align with the prevailing power dynamics. This stance indicated his preference to remain neutral initially and later align with the party holding greater sway.
The United National Party suffered a significant setback in the 1994 Presidential Election, exacerbated by the loss of its leader and candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, leaving the party in disarray. With CBK securing victory by a considerable margin, the UNP faced defeat nationwide, retaining only the Mahiyangana seat. Despite initially assuming the role of Prime Minister after a narrow victory in the August ‘94 Parliamentary Election, Chandrika failed to substantially propel the nation’s progress during her tenure. The sudden announcement of a Presidential Election later that year caught only four Ministers off guard, raising questions about potential internal scheming within her government and prompting speculation about the motives behind the timing of the announcement. Was it a calculated move by a desperate leader?
Both the UNP and PA encountered the prospect of their members defecting to the opposition in pursuit of forming a National Government. Leaders CBK and Ranil Wickremesinghe grappled with the challenge of party stalwarts being courted by newly formed alliances to run for the Presidency. The sudden demise of Minister Saumayamurthi Thondaman provided some relief to the opposition, prompting frantic efforts to assess the voting power commanded by the CWC leader and strategize on winning back block votes to the UNP. Similarly, disgruntled members within the PA were contemplating switching allegiance to the UNP.
Cross-overs
One significant potential crossover that threatened to disrupt the political landscape was Dr. Amunugama, a staunch supporter of Gamini Dissanayake. Dr. Amunugama engaged in extensive discussions with both the PA and the UNP before ultimately deciding to cross over. His decision was crucial for CBK’s camp while dealing a severe blow to the UNP. In response, the UNP swiftly acted to address the situation, sending a letter to Amunugama seeking an explanation. General Secretary Gamini Atukorala wrote:
The Daily News, in its November 1, 1999 publication, reported under the headline ‘Sarath Amunugama tells BBC he will quit UNP,’ stating that ‘he will definitely leave the UNP if there is no proper response from the Party for his National Government concept.’ It is noted that there has been no denial by you regarding the making of this statement or the accuracy of the contents of the article. Therefore, you have acted in breach of the party constitution, party discipline, and contrary to the conduct required of a Member of Parliament. The decision of the Parliamentary Group, made during its meeting held on October 22, 1999, stated that no member makes any statements to the media without prior approval of the party. I request your immediate explanation and response to the aforementioned by no later than Sunday, November 7, 1999.
The reasons behind the potential crossovers were numerous. Within a short span, over 25 UNPers, identifying themselves as the ‘Eksath Jathika Pakshaye Vikalpa Balawegaya’ (Alternative power block of UNP), including six MPs, were preparing to convene at Temple Trees in the presence of PA Cabinet members to explore the formation of a national government with the PA. “We would not entertain the thought of leaving the party,” Dr. Amunugama asserted in a statement, adding, “We will function as an alternative group alongside the government.” However, by the subsequent week, the UNP rebels, led by Sarath Amunugama, had finalised their plans, culminating in a meeting with the President at an auspicious time.
Loyalty and divisions
The defectors were confident that this change in loyalty would effectively divide the party, echoing the significant impact akin to Bandaranaike’s defection from the UNP in 1951. The proposed de facto crossover seemed advantageous for CBK, sparking concerns within the UNP leadership. Party Chairman Karu Jayasuriya made a frantic attempt to reconcile the warring factions, leveraging his negotiating skills. However, despite his efforts, which included enlisting the help of Bodhi Ranasinghe and Dayananda Wickremasinghe to engage with rebel and former Minister Nanda Mathew, no positive outcome was achieved.
Despite dispatching another emissary to meet Wijeyapala Mendis, conveying the leader’s eagerness for a meeting, all efforts proved futile for the UNP as the rebels remained steadfast in their alignment with CBK while retaining their UNP membership. Faced with this defiance, the UNP had no option but to demand an explanation and initiate disciplinary proceedings against them, ultimately leading to their dismissal. Meanwhile, the rebels contemplated seeking recourse through the Supreme Court, a process that would take a minimum of two months for resolution. A spokesperson for the rebel group noted that by then, the Presidential Election would have concluded, shaping the course of their plans. Should Chandrika Kumaratunga secure re-election, it would bolster their aspirations for a national government. Conversely, a victory for Ranil Wickremesinghe would present a starkly different scenario for them.
The UNP rebel group, comprising Members of Parliament, Provincial Councillors, and Local Government members, convened customary meetings at a clandestine location on Bullers Road. Their efforts included attempting to persuade former General Secretary Sirisena Cooray to join their cause. Cooray, who was out of the country, was expected to return before the Presidential Elections. In a bid to sway him, the UNP leadership enlisted the help of Milinda Moragoda, who shared a close relationship with Cooray.
(to be continued)
