In this case a youth had been sentenced to death in the High Court. He had kidnapped a boy who had returned from school, 
and was following his daily routine. The kidnapped boy was a rich jewellery businessman’s son in Beruwala. A large sum of money was demanded —- 2.5 million in 1999 — and the wealthy businessman was left scrambling to find the amount with the banks closed for the weekend.
The youth was subsequently apprehended and appealed his conviction and sentence in the Supreme Court (Nuwan De Silva V the Attorney General – SLR – 146, Vol 1 of 2005 [2004] LKSC 5; (2005) 1 Sri LR 146 (September 9, 2004)).
The judgement states:
“This is an appeal from the conviction entered and sentences imposed on the accused appellant (the accused) at a Trial-at-Bar of the High Court. In terms of Section 451 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, No. 21 of 1988, the appeal has to be heard by a Bench of not less than five Judges of this Court.
The accused was charged on three counts of, having kidnapped a boy named Sadeepa Lakshan, (an offence punishable under section 354 of the Penal Code), committing the murder of the boy (an offence punishable under Section 296 of the Penal Code) and of extorting Rs. 2.5 million from Nihal Jayantha de Silva being the father of the boy (an offence punishable under Section 375 of the Penal Code), between the 8th and 11th of October 1999.”
The High Court convicted the accused on all three counts (kidnapping, murder and extortion) and he was sentenced to death on the count of murder and to terms of imprisonment and fines on the other counts.
The young man who carried out the deadly deed had called the father of the child who had not told anyone about the calls or the demand for ransom because he had presumably been told his son would be killed if the Police are informed. But fortunately a person whom the businessman employed at his workplace got to know what was happening, and informed the Police, who kept a very close track of the movements of the accused.
A confession was recorded by the Magistrate under terms of Section 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The accused was 
kept for five days in detention under a detention order which was permissible at the time and produced before a magistrate and thereafter remanded.
The Supreme Court judgement states:
“On 17th October when the accused was produced before the acting Magistrate, he expressed the desire to make a confession. He was then informed that a confession could be made on the next date when the case came up before the permanent Magistrate.”
However since the act was outrageous there was a raucous crowd baying for blood outside the courthouse, and the accused could not be brought for the confession because of the security threat that ensued. The accused however was taken before the Magistrate at the latter’s residence where he made a confession and made a detailed description of all aspects of the crime.
The judgement states:
“The accused in the statement revealed the entire incident from the point at which he decided to commit the offence of extortion. He had a love affair with a girl in the area and there was an objection on the part of the girl and her mother to the continuance of the affair, since he had no job. At that time he had seen on television the news of an incident of abduction and ransom, where a large sum of money had been paid out. He decided that he could make quick money in this way and picked on the deceased boy as a person who could be kidnapped and his father being a wealthy businessman as the person from whom ransom could be obtained.”
A great deal turned on whether the confession was voluntary and the law ensured that any confession made through either coercion, or some inducement so as it is not voluntary, is inadmissible. The Counsel for the appellant submitted that the confession had not been voluntary and that the Magistrate did not even get an ‘yes’ answer to the question put to the accused asking whether the confession had been voluntary.
But the ‘yes’ answer had indeed been given by the accused, Court pointed out, and gave the exact pages more or less ‘quoting chapter and verse,’ and said Counsel may have overlooked it in the case record.
The Supreme Court judgement states:
“The line of questioning by the Magistrate should be directed at ascertaining whether the person was sufficiently removed from the pervasive influence of the Police or of any person in authority and the decision to make the confession has been of his own free will. Section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance vitiates a confession where from the circumstances it appears that there was an inducement, threat or promise from a person in authority on the basis of which the accused could have reasonably assumed that he would get an advantage or avoid any evil in reference to the proceedings against him by making the confession”.
Section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance makes clear that a confession extracted by inducement making the accused feel he or she would derive some advantage is inadmissible. But the same Section makes it clear that if the accused saw an advantage for himself and made the confession on that basis, that will not make the confession invalid or words to that effect. For example, if the accused himself felt that he would get a lighter sentence if he confessed and if it’s reasonably clear that he made that deduction himself there would not be any problem admitting that confession as evidence.
The Supreme Court judgement states:
“It was held that such a motivation should not result in the confession being excluded. The following observations are relevant to the facts of this case –
“Very few confessions are inspired solely by remorse. Often the motives of an accused are mixed and include a hope that an early admission may lead to an earlier release or lighter sentence. If it were the law that the mere presence of such a motive, even if prompted by something said or done by a person in authority, led inexorably to the exclusion of a confession, nearly every confession would be rendered inadmissible. This is not the law. In some cases the hope may be self-generated. If so, it is irrelevant, even if it provides the dominant motive for making of the confession”.
For example, the prisoner may be aware as most are that they would be able to bring their detention to a speedy end by a confession and hardly any accused is not aware of this and so they may confess, of their own volition, in the hope of securing early release from detention. Surely, they must also be aware that they can subsequently recant the confession.
If such a motive was present it does not matter if it was the predominant motive for the confession, as that consideration becomes irrelevant.
“We do not understand the speeches delivered in the House of Lords in DPP vs Ping Lin to require the exclusion of every such confession ………………..” Court opined meaning that certain confessions could be excluded due to the taint of authorities extorting influence etc. but the exact circumstances that could lead to such exclusion were to be decided in the courts of law.
Court opined that the Trial judge would have a good grasp of “the effect and flavour of circumstances in which the confession was made.” In the case under review, the trial Judge saw no reason to exclude the confession of the accused.
For the reasons stated above the appeal was dismissed and the conviction entered and the sentences imposed affirmed.
