In this case of an Election Petition against the 1st respondent (Abeywickrema v. Pathirana – SLR – 215, Vol 1 of 1984 [1984] LKSC 16; (1984) 1 Sri LR 215 (1 January 1984)), there were legal and constitutional considerations that framed the preliminary objections raised during the proceedings of a case in the Supreme Court. The crux of the matter rested on whether the Election Court (E.C), which was the Court of Appeal, possessed the jurisdiction to scrutinize the validity of the resignation letter submitted by the 1st respondent to the Regional Director of Education, Galle. The 1st respondent had submitted his resignation from the job of school principal before contesting the election as a candidate. The legal basis for the objection was based on Article 55 (5) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, leading to a complicated intersection of constitutional interpretation and election law.
The counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the Election Court lacked the authority to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the acceptance of the resignation, fundamentally arguing that this matter was to be addressed solely by the Supreme Court according to Article 125(1) of the Constitution. Article 55 (5) stipulates that certain actions regarding public officers, including appointments and resignations, may not be subject to judicial review. This being a constitutional matter, only the Supreme Court was entitled to rule on it. Counsel invoked the necessity of adhering to constitutional provisions regarding inquiries into the decisions of public officers.
Counsel for the petitioner and Senior State Counsel countered that Article 55 (5) was inapplicable to the case at hand. He contended that the legitimacy of the resignation letter was pertinent to the election process and should therefore be within the purview of the Election Court. Justice G. P. S. de Silva, serving as the Election Judge, subsequently referred the matter to the Supreme Court, seeking clarification on a vital constitutional question: “Is the acceptance of a resignation of a public officer, an order or decision which… cannot be inquired into… in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to try Election Petitions?”
Supreme Court judgment
The Supreme Court turned its attention to the interpretation of Article 55 (5), looking into the article’s relationship to the broader constitutional framework that governs the appointment and control of public officers. The Court concluded that the laws in Article 55 (5) are applicable solely in situations where public officers execute powers delegated by the Public Service Commission regarding disciplinary matters. This interpretation makes out that such protections arise exclusively from formalized delegations of authority as stipulated in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court judgment stated that the fundamental structure of Chapter IX of the Constitution, which establishes that powers regarding public officers—including their appointment, transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control—are initially held by the Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet, as specified in Articles 55 (1), (2), and (3), may delegate these powers to the Public Service Commission but retains authority over specific appointments, particularly Heads of Departments. Importantly, these articles specify conditions under which authority may be concurrently exercised by two separate parties in Government/administration through delegation.
To expand on the matter, Article 57 (1) confirms that upon direction from the Cabinet, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission may create committees to exercise designated powers pertaining to specified categories of public officers. This process emphasizes the hierarchical structure of authority manifest in public service roles within the Governmental framework. Additionally, Article 58 (1) stipulates that the Public Service Commission or any designated committee can delegate powers to a public officer, based on the Cabinet’s stipulations.
In the present case, the petitioner submitted that the Regional Director of Education lacked the legal capacity to accept the 1st respondent’s resignation. Pivotal to this argument was the assertion that the Regional Director was not identified as a public officer authorized, as per Article 58 (1), to exercise such acceptance. Thus, devoid of proper authority, the acceptance of the 1st respondent’s resignation was, it was submitted, null and void.
Implied authority
Counsel for the 1st respondent, Mr. H. L. de Silva, submitted a nuanced defense emphasizing the principle of implied authority. He submitted that powers as articulated in Article 58 (1) could manifest either through explicit or implicit delegation. Mr. De Silva highlighted a pattern wherein the Regional Director had a history of accepting resignation letters from subordinates, with no decisive pushback from the Ministry or Department of Education. This historical practice made for a presumption of implied delegation, suggesting that, secondarily, the Regional Director might possess the authority to accept the resignation due to customary acceptance without formal objection.
In this context, the case reflects the complexities surrounding the interpretation of constitutional powers, the role of delegated authority, and the judiciary’s jurisdiction in electoral matters. The delicate balance of interpreting constitutional provisions against established practices is relevant to the resolution of such disputes, and the involvement of time-tested procedural norms comes under scrutiny. Ultimately, the determination reflected a substantial analysis of the constitutional framework, illustrating how legal interpretations may determine the separate dynamics of public service governance and electoral integrity.
In the final part of the case judgment, the Court delved into the intricate issues surrounding the delegation of powers under Article 58 (1) of the Constitution, particularly concerning the authority of the Regional Director of Education, Galle. The onus lay upon the petitioner to establish that there has not been an express delegation of the relevant powers to the Regional Director, which concerned the acceptance of a resignation and the termination of services.
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Choksy, contended that the concept of implied delegation is insufficient to satisfy the explicit requirements set forth in Article 58 (1). The Court acknowledged this argument but clarified that the determination of whether an express or implied delegation exists rests significantly on factual findings that the Election Judge must establish.
Accurate legal assessment
The Court proceeded to emphasize that without the Election Judge’s factual findings, an accurate legal assessment cannot be made. They empowered the Election Judge to identify if express delegation existed or not. Should the Election Judge conclude that express delegation is absent, the next step should go into the scope of implied delegation that may have occurred subsequently. Here, the vital constitutional interpretation at stake is whether implied delegation can suffice under the framework of Article 58 (1) and how it interacts with Article 55 (5).
Article 55 (5) addresses the procedures regarding the resignation of public officers, and the Court conceded that its invocation in this case could further complicate the issue of delegating powers. The question revolving around what constitutes legal resignation—whether it falls under the general authority of a Regional Director—will play a pivotal role in the findings after the Election Judge goes into the facts of the case.
The Court also articulated the necessity for an expedient resolution of the Election Petition, ensuring the Election Judge addresses the outstanding issues without unnecessary delay. The Court was committed to procedural justice but stressed the importance of timely adjudication in electoral matters. The judges recognized the potential implications for democracy and governance when election-related disputes are unresolved.
The case was sent back to the Election Judge for a factual inquiry.
