A presentation was made in Yangon Myanmar by Bernard Goonethilleke, Chairman Pathfinder Foundation, on “The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Considering Security Implications” sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES.
By now, a fairly large segment of the world population is aware of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an important component of China’s economic policy, with geo-political implications, which has been recently incorporated in to the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party.
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| Bernard Goonethilleke |
A vast amount of funding has been earmarked for the project. New institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Silk Road Fund have been created to provide resources for the project. The magnitude of the project could be determined by the estimate provided by the Asia Development Bank (ADB) that its 45-member countries, most of whom support BRI, would require US$ 22.6 trillion of infrastructure by 2030.
Understandably, a mega project of this nature would also attract detractors. The name, ancient ‘Silk Road’, harks back to history, when caravans connected the land route from Europe to China across Asia, and ancient mariners braved the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean ferrying merchants, mendicants and explorers. However, this time around, we are speaking of long distance diesel locomotives, mega-container-ships and ultra -large crude carriers (ULCC), massive industrial zones occupying thousands of acres and employing tens of thousands of workers. Massive projects of this nature would bring non-traditional security issues such as land rights, large scale migration, environmental degradation, scarcity of water resources, over exploitation of natural resources etc. to the fore. Drivers of BRI should not ignore these negative non-traditional security issues.
Against this backdrop we need to address security implications of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), covering vast stretches of sea from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile the EU is keen to know how the ‘Road’ would affect their interests, while across the Atlantic, the United States is cautious of the impact of BRI on its global interests. Meanwhile, India with large stretches of unsettled border with China and one of the spurs of the ‘Belt’ known as C-PEC cutting through the ‘disputed territory’ to reach Pakistan’s Gwadar port, has reacted negatively.
To assess the effects of the ‘Road’ on the traditional security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the prevailing ground situation should be evaluated.
The broad deliverables under BRI have been published by Xinhua to coincide with the BRI Summit of May 2017. However, despite lack of clarity on the final architecture of BRI, the project has attracted a large number of countries in Asia, Africa and also some in Europe, representing 63% of the world population and 29% of global GDP.
China is poised to become the world’s leading economic power by about 2030, with India occupying 3rd position after the US. With growing economic interests, China’s military strategy has undergone considerable transformation, as observed in the ‘China’s Military Strategy of 2015’, which spoke of the need for safeguarding “China’s security and interests in new domains” and “security of China’s overseas interests”.
Jettisoning its earlier policy of non-establishing bases outside its national borders, Beijing has established a ‘logistic base’ in Djibouti. Meanwhile, there is suspicion in certain quarters that China would establish similar facilities in the Indian Ocean, where Chinese companies have acquired controlling powers.
With military, naval and air force bases spread in many countries from the Gulf to the Philippines, the USA has been the hegemonic power in the Asia-pacific region. Consequently, the US is wary of China – a relatively new comer- moving in to the Indian Ocean - first to engage in anti-piracy work in the Horn of Africa and later establish naval facilities - notwithstanding the fact France, Japan and the US too enjoy similar facilities in Djibouti.
However, there are signs of waning military might and commitment of the US in the IOR, creating doubts as to how it would respond to security threats developing in the region. It appears, that the US expects India to shoulder some responsibility in addressing the situation, bearing in mind China’s increasing naval power in the region, supported by Chinese owned or managed port facilities under BRI, would be a threat to India’s national security. It may be that, over a period of time, Washington expects New Delhi to take over the role of security guarantor in the region, which would not go unchallenged.
China is party to many security alliances, in which other countries such as India, Pakistan etc. play a role. The most recent is the formation of Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) to counter terrorism and share intelligence in August 2016, by military leaders of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the eight- nation security alliance, in which both India and Pakistan are new members, is an important gathering. Meanwhile, the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) consisting of 27 countries and established to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues in the Asia-pacific region, primarily serves the ASEAN, but includes other countries such as China, India, Pakistan Russia, the US and the EU. It is noteworthy that four of the seven South Asian countries take part in the ARF.
However, given the current political and security relations, formation of a security alliance among the SAARC countries is not a feasible exercise.
Would BRI help greater security cooperation or trigger further competition & mistrust?
Taking in to consideration the current dynamics involving major players, it is conceivable that BRI would cause further competition rather than cooperation. Consequently, greater militarization of IOR will be on cards. India has made its position clear in a statement made to coincide with the BRI summit last May, highlighting its concerns, which sentiments were re-emphasized by Prime minister Modi in Astana, a month later.
In fact, BRI has already triggered some competition in the form of “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC) launched by India and Japan at the African Development Bank meeting, held in Gujarat 10 days after the BRI summit. Last week, India signed a US$85 million agreement with Iran to lease Shahid Beheshti Port at Chabahar, providing connectivity to Afghanistan and beyond.
This competition may not necessarily transform in to confrontation ending up with hostilities in the Indian Ocean involving countries in the region. However, both India and the US would be obliged to prevent China from establishing a foothold in the IOR on the back of MSR, and later turning the ports managed by them in to logistic supply facilities or bases for PLN. On the other hand, it is unlikely that countries in the region would knowingly and willingly subject their countries to such predicament.
Both China and India are in favour of a “new security architecture” as stated by respective political leaders. However, it is not clear how this architecture would be developed.
‘China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’ released in January 2017 provides a glimpse of Chinese thinking on the subject, where reference is made to China’s willingness to “pursue security through dialogue and cooperation in the spirit of working together”. Expert observation of the paper is, China seeks to bring countries in Southeast Asia to its orbit, away from reliance on the US for their security.
EU is keen to understand implications of the MSR and the security situation the Road would generate on the Union. With no fundamental issues against BRI, some EU countries have embraced the Chinese initiative with half of the 28 member EU associating themselves with the AIIB, a principal institution that would drive BRI financially.
It is hard to predict to what extent the EU would be affected due to the expanding Chinese influence in the IOR and the competition and possible confrontation that would follow. EU has no direct military involvement with the states in the IOR, at least in the traditional military sense. To a great extent positive or negative impact would depend on how the EU would develop its strategy in responding to the mega infrastructure project of China that would touch the lives of the people from the Strait of Malacca in the east to the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden in the west.
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