A part analysis of John Kerry Report on Sri Lanka

Sarojini Dutt

Stunned by the unexpected annihilation of the terrorists in Sri Lanka and fearing consequently a grave threat to US security interests in the region, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR) hastily scrambled two of its staff members to visit the island nation in the first week of November 2009 with a mandate to evaluate the fall out of the terrorist debacle on US policy in the island and geopolitical, in the region; the two member team were required to made recommendations immediately to stem the alarming deterioration of US leverage on the island.

Arriving in the island at a time when security sensitivity remained high, the evaluating team travelled the country during their weeklong stay with the approval and support of the Sri Lanka Government.

In reciprocation of this courtesy it is to be expected that the report would be couched in veiled parlance. On reading the report one cannot but be taken aback that, coincidentally, LTTE fortunes have a direct correlation to US policy on the island and to US geo-strategic interests in the region.

Foreign policy objectives

On December 7, 2009 John Kerry, the Chairman of the SCFR, circulating the two member report among the rest of the committee members, makes comment by stressing the strategic importance of Sri Lanka to the US particularly, as the report emphasizes, the geopolitical location of the island; he goes on to add the need to maintain a strategic alliance with the island and the need to re-evaluate US foreign policy in the wake of the military defeat of the LTTE.

It would appear that the US, placing reliance on a fundamentally flawed assumption of the military invincibility of the terrorists, laid all their strategic chips on the LTTE, sadly ignoring other foreign policy tools that were at their disposal. As the report states, Rajapaksa did the unthinkable and the unexpected; his achievement was one of the few instances in modern history in which a terrorist group had been militarily defeated.

When finally Washington realized the vulnerability of the terrorists, in the face of the rolling Government juggernaut, and the fragility and folly of their chosen ‘single agenda’ policy option, desperate attempts were made, finally at the level of the White House, to rescue and salvage US interests by endeavours that included attempts at coercing Sri Lanka to negotiate a truce with the terrorists.

Much of the chagrin with Rajapaksa flows from his recalcitrance to comply. US foreign policy collapsed in the waters of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

Washington admittedly cannot be too happy with Blake who is seen as the chief proponent of the failed policy which has created a temporary power void for the US in the immediate region.

The report is extremely critical of his single agenda policy which has resulted in shortchanging US strategic interests in the region. Wearing his new hat, Blake, it is to be anticipated, would have his time cutout, repairing the damage to US interests in the region, perceived as his responsibility, and further, initiating action to vindicate his previous miscalculations.

Team mission

It was in this backdrop that the special team from Washington was dispatched to Colombo. Their mission: To make recommendations to prevent further erosion of US security interests in the island and increase US leverage in Sri Lanka for securing longer term US strategic interests, expanding the number of tools available at Washington’s disposal.

Serious dichotomy of views

The urgency of the mission also suggests a serious dichotomy of views in Washington. On one side of the coin Blake, described in certain circles, in oxymoronic terms as the smiling ‘Ugly American’, pursuing the failed hard-line policy of all stick while on the flip side, a breath of fresh air from the new Obama administration, wishing to engage in more-carrot-and-less-stick policy.

The visiting team did a quick situational analysis, weighing the ground situation, the strategic importance of the island, the weaknesses and consequences of US policy hitherto pursued, the strengths and vulnerabilities of Sri Lanka State, the US strengths in the island and the tactical options at the disposal of Washington.

The report describes Sri Lanka as being located geographically at the nexus of the maritime trading routes connecting Europe and the Middle East to China and the rest of Asia.

All of China’s and Japan’s energy resources from the Persian Gulf, as the report identifies, transits Sri Lanka and the island has the potential to control or impede the free flow these resources to China, an emerging global power, or to Japan, a strategic partner of the US.

Free flow of trade

Furthermore, half of the world’s container traffic passes through Sri Lanka and the island has again, as indicated before, the potential to control or impede the free flow of trade in the Indian Ocean.

The island lends itself naturally to be an effective choke point, the control of which provides a strong bargaining platform in global rivalries; shades of Somalia where sea terrorists, often referred to as pirates, directed by some unidentified power, impede shipping in the Arabian Sea of the Indian Ocean.

In fact the report makes reference to some acts of piracy off one of the myriads of islands that lie to the West of Sri Lanka.

New great game

The US, as the report explains, has a competing interest with India and China in securing this maritime route; Sri Lanka says the report, is a key piece in a larger geopolitical dynamic, commonly described as the new Great Game.

Potential to destabilize India

The Washington report also identifies the potential of Sri Lanka to destabilize India; it states that the communal tensions in Sri Lanka Sinhala-Tamil or Hindu-Muslim, have the ability to undermine stability in India, particularly Tamil Nadu, home to sixty million Hindu Tamils.

Two thirds of coastline

Unfortunately for the US, the structure of their foreign policy in this region, based on the invincibility of the terrorists, crumbled dramatically when Rajapaksa annihilated the terrorists.

If the LTTE had succeeded, the US would have gained control of two thirds of Sri Lanka coastline, enabling them to secure Persian Gulf energy resources to Japan, interfere if and when the need arose, with the flow of these same resources to China, selectively interfere with free trade in the Indian Ocean and undermine stability in India by provoking Tamil and Hindu sentiments in Tamil Nadu.

The Sea Tigers, the naval arm of the defeated terrorists, which had alarmingly become a very potent force, had the hallmarks of a nascent ‘pirate’ organisation.

To make matters worse not only did Rajapaksa destroy the cornerstone of US policy in the region but he was, as the report identified, responsible for the country’s drift towards China (and the non Western world), considered one of the biggest challengers to US hegemony of the world.

All this threatens US National Security interests and Rajapaksa is considered a threat to US National Security.

US policy, the report states, has to be re-charted. A regime change is considered imperative; Rajapaksa must go.

To be continued